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NOTE
Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying Prohibitions
and Exemptions
Song of the Open Road
I think that I shall never see
A billboard lovely as a tree.
Indeed, unless the billboards fall,
I'll never see a tree at all.1

These four lines from humorist Ogden Nash reflect what is probably a widespread aesthetic judgment about billboards. 2 The title is, of
course, highly ironic: There is nothing "open" about a road so cluttered with billboards that country scenery is obscured. Actually, Nash
put the matter gently. He did not say that billboards are ugly, only
that they are out of place - at least where the aesthetic properties of
natural objects would otherwise be enjoyed. 3 In fact, the word
"think" in line one leaves open the theoretical possibility (slim to be
sure) of encountering a billboard which, due to its own beauty, would
not arouse in the viewer a distinct preference to gaze at something else.
But the posing of this possibility accentuates its remoteness.
The final two lines convey a certain illogic. Unless joined together
to create a barricade, billboards along an "open road" would not literally conceal every tree. But a multitude of billboards (or just one
placed precisely) - due to their function as eye-catching devices can prevent a person from noticing a single tree though there may be
many within view.4
When the aesthetic concern captured by "Song of the Open Road"
becomes widespread, a law prohibiting billboards often results. Wide
disagreement exists as to whether a city or state may, consistently with
the first amendment, drastically reduce or even eliminate outdoor
signs for aesthetic reasons. Isolating the issues dividing those who
1. 0. NASH, I WOULDN'T HAVE MlssED IT: SELECTED POEMS OF OGDEN NASH 31 (1975)
(quoted in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 886, 610 P.2d 407, 429, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510, 532 (1980)). The poem is a tongue-in-cheek allusion to Joyce Kilmer's "Trees,"
which begins "I think that I shall never see/ A poem as lovely as a tree." 1 J. KILMER, POEMS,
EssAYS AND LETTERS IN Two VOLUMES 180 (1918).
2. This Note uses the term "billboard" not in its customary and generic sense as a synonym
for a permanent outdoor sign, but in its technical sense, meaning "offsite sign." This technical
use of the term is in keeping with the court opinions cited in this Note. See infra note 9 for this
Note's definition of "offsite sign."
3. See Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80
MICH. L. REv. 355 (1982), for an argument that a perception of beauty or ugliness is merely a
perception of something being either in or out of place.
4. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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generally would defer to local aesthetic interests from those who generally would not, this Note traces the difficulties the courts have had in
locating and justifying a standard for deciding these cases. The Note
argues for a standard sympathetic with local desires to ban billboards.
According to this standard, only signs that identify the premises on
which they are located may not be prohibited. 5 While this standard
has occasionally been advocated, it has never been fully defended. 6
That defense is ultimately the task of this Note.
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City ofSan Diego 7 the Supreme Court wrestled with the first amendment questions raised by sign prohibitions for
the first time, but left many of them unresolved. The Court produced
five separate opinions and no majority. Then-Justice Rehnquist referred to the Court's effort as a "virtual Tower of Babel, from which
no definitive principles can be clearly drawn." 8
In Metromedia the Court struck down a San Diego ordinance that
prohibited all offsite signs9 but permitted onsite signs10 for commercial
purposes. 11 However, the ordinance also exempted signs within
5. This standard would also permit a state or city to protect additional signs if this protection
has a reasonable relation to the aesthetic objectives of the sign regulation and does not indicate
an intent to control public debate by prohibiting or exempting controversial subject matter. See
infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
6. Stephen Williams has pointed out that ordinances that "protect a class of signs that relate
.•• closely to their locations" cannot be considered "antiexpression" measures, for they merely
acknowledge the unique relation between sign and land in such cases. Williams, Subjectivity,
Expression, and Privacy: Problems ofAesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. l, 43 (1977). Similarly, John Lucking has argued that signs that identify the products and services available where
the sign is located deserve favored status over other signs. Lucking, The Regulation of Outdoor
Advertising: Past, Present, and Future, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 179, 193 (1977). However, both Williams
and Lucking wrote four years prior to the Supreme Court decision now controlling billboard
disputes, whose plurality held that a court must inquire whether an affected sign is co=ercial
or nonco=ercial, not identifying or nonidentifying. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
7. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
8. 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. For purposes of this Note, an offsite sign is a sign, either co=ercial or nonco=ercial,
which advertises activities not conducted, services not provided, or products not dispensed or
sold on the premises where the sign is located. This definition is in keeping with the court opinions cited in this Note. Moreover, a billboard is an offsite sign. See supra note 2.
10. The term "onsite sign" refers to signs, co=ercial or nonco=ercial, that refer to or
identify activities conducted, services provided, or products sold or dispensed on the premises
where the sign is located. This definition of "onsite sign" is consistent with court opinions cited
in this Note that employ the onsite/offsite distinction.
11. The ordinance stated:
Only those outdoor advertising display signs .•• which are either signs designating the name
of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying
such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on
the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted.
453 U.S. at 493 n.1. Justice Brennan disputed the plurality's contention that this provision did
not apply equally to co=ercial and nonco=ercial signs. 453 U.S. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The ordinance exempts identifying signs generally in addition to "onsite signs." None of the
Metromedia opinions makes anything of this fact, nor observes that an onsite sign is merely one
type of identifying sign. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. See also Part IV for argu-
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twelve specific categories, both commercial and noncommercial. Justice White, writing for the plurality, found the ordinance unconstitutional for two reasons. First, in exempting commercial onsite signs
but not noncommercial onsite signs, the ordinance favored commercial over noncommercial speech. Second, the ordinance favored certain noncommercial signs over other noncommercial signs. White
thus indicated two defects either of which would invalidate an
ordinance.
Ambiguities within the plurality opinion have spawned two contradictory interpretations of Metromedia. One view permits the prohibition of commercial signs but protects all noncommercial signs (the
"commercial/noncommercial distinction"). The other view permits
prohibition of noncommercial signs as long as the ordinance affords
equal protection to commercial and noncommercial signs; this view
allows governments to exempt all onsite signs while prohibiting all offsite signs (the "onsite/offsite distinction").
These distinctions rely on divergent conceptions of "content-neutrality." The commercial/noncommercial distinction forbids restrictions on noncommercial signs that in any way depend on what a sign
says or what function the sign serves. The onsite/offsite distinction
requires only that the restriction not discriminate according to point of
view or subject matter. For instance, the former distinction would not
permit an exemption for any class of sign, even if potentially the class
includes any point of view, because a sign's content must be assessed in
order to determine its class. Conversely, the latter distinction would
allow an exemption for a class of signs - onsite signs - as long as
every sign within that class was exempt.
The onsite/offsite distinction clearly gives greater leeway to local
aesthetic interests than does the commercial/noncommercial distinction. The latter distinction removes aesthetic considerations from the
equation: it protects each noncommercial sign regardless of whether it
is more offensive or intrusive than a commercial sign. This Note argues that while the onsite/offsite distinction is superior to the commercial/noncommercial distinction, it fails to include other signs that
should be protected under the rationale needed to protect onsite signs.
Onsite signs should be protected because, as they identify the premises
on which they are located, they cannot be replaced by an alternative
means of communication. 12 Therefore, all identifying signs - not just
onsite signs - must be protected. Hence, the most appropriate distinction to employ in evaluating sign prohibitions is the "identifying/
nonidentifying distinction."
Part I of this Note surveys the trends in the aesthetic regulation of
ments as to why the identifying/nonidentifying distinction should be the critical distinction in
determining what signs must be protected.
12. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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billboards, culminating in the Supreme Court of California's decision
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 13 and the Supreme Court's
review of that decision. Part II analyzes the five Metromedia opinions
in order to present properly the contemporary debate over billboard
law. It inquires whether a sign prohibition should hinge on the commercial or noncommercial status of the targeted signs. Part III indicates how ambiguities in the Metromedia plurality opinion have
produced the conflict in lower courts between the commercial/noncommercial distinction and the onsite/offsite distinction, and examines
some of the problems created by the application of these distinctions.
Part IV argues that the Constitution should protect only those signs
that cannot be replaced by alternative means of communication. It
repudiates the commerciaVnoncommercial distinction for failing to
protect signs according to this standard, and criticizes the onsite/offsite distinction for affording special protection to only one type of sign
for which alternative means are lacking. Part IV then argues that the
identifying/nonidentifying distinction would serve as an appropriate
check on the wide discretion governments need to address the aesthetic problems posed by billboards.

I.

REGULATING AEsTHETICS BY BANNING BILLBOARDS

During the early part of the twentieth century, local regulators in
various states reacted to the sudden proliferation of billboards by passing laws restricting them. 14 The courts invalidated most of these laws
for being motivated solely by aesthetic concerns and therefore beyond
the scope of the police power. 15 Consequently, cities began to cite
other reasons for prohibiting or restricting billboards, reasons safely
within the traditional scope of the police power: protecting property
values, protecting the tourist industry, or promoting traffic safety. 16
To uphold billboard laws, courts developed what has been called the
"aesthetics-plus doctrine," which approved a billboard law if it merely
furthered a customary police power goal in addition to addressing aesthetic concerns.17
Courts have held aesthetic objectives suspect because they seem
unavoidably subjective. 18 Courts fear the ever-changing nature of aesthetic judgment, 19 and the fact that the majority, in pursuing aesthetic
13. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980). ,
14. Dukeminier, Zoning far Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 218, 219 (1955).
15. Id.
16. Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and
the Realities ofBillboard Control, 9 EcoLOGY L.Q. 295, 295 (1981); see also Costonis, supra note
3, at 374.
17. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 303.
18. Costonis, supra note 3, at 396-409; Dukeminier, supra note 14, at 225.
19. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 662, 148 N.E.
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objectives, could trample basic individual rights by imposing its arbitrary tastes on the minority. 20 And Justice Brennan has recently argued that when the state justifies a restriction of individual rights on
aesthetic grounds, the "inherent subjectivity" of the justification "impairs the ability of a reviewing court" to conduct a meaningful
review. 21
Despite its dangers, aesthetic policymaking cannot be entirely
abandoned, for it undergirds ordinances such as zoning laws, for
which political support will likely increase.22 However, the aestheticsplus doctrine fails to provide a dependable standard for policymaking,
as it allows a court to validate aesthetically motivated legislation without saying it is doing so.23 Courts have generally deferred to legislative decisions that billboards affect a legitimate police power concern,
for it is difficult to prove that they do not. 24 But, "it is unclear why
aesthetics are a proper justification when in combination with another
police-power objective and yet not when standing alone." 25 If the subjectivity of aesthetic judgments renders these judgments invalid foundations for law, then legislation motivated by such judgments should
be struck down regardless of the fact that a secondary justification has
been offered as well.
Following the current trend, the California Supreme Court, in
1980, repudiated the aesthetics-plus doctrine as "unworkable" in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 the case later reviewed by the
Supreme Court. 27 Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner argued that
the aesthetics-plus doctrine was "discordant with modern thought as
to the scope of the police power."28 He noted that economic and aesthetic considerations cannot be distinguished in a state that relies on
aesthetic values to attract tourists. 29 Moreover, Justice Tobriner ar842, 844 (1925) ("The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations were permitted to govern the use of the police power.").
20. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905) ("a man may [not] be deprived of his property because his
tastes are not those of his neighbors").
21. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 822 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Costonis, supra note 3, at 459.
23. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 302; Dukeminier, supra note 14, at 220-23.
24. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 859, 610 P.2d 407, 412,
164 Cal. Rptr, 510, 515 (1980). A police-power justification puts the burden of proof on the
law's opponent, who must prove there exists no rational connection between restricting billboards and the stated police power goal - usually traffic safety. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at
306.
25. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 307.
26. 26 Cal. 3d at 848, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (1980).
27. 453 U.S. 490 (1981); see infra Part II.
28. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
29. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
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gued that modem urban planning "would be virtually impossible" if
aesthetic objectives were invalid. 30 A city could not pass basic zoning
ordinances designed to improve appearances. 31 And Tobriner observed that most jurisdictions had accepted the Supreme Court's recognition of a state's general right to regulate aesthetics in Berman v.
Parker:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the Legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 32

Berman raised no first amendment issues. It upheld a municipal
plan to remove unsightly slum housing. 33 But relying on a New York
case validating a city-wide ban on billboards, 34 Justice Tobriner argued that such an ordinance should be upheld unless its method for
achieving aesthetic goals is arbitrary or irrational. 35
When the Supreme Court reversed Tobriner's opinion, five justices
nevertheless agreed that a city's aesthetic interest in removing visual
clutter justified a ban on billboards. 36 Thus, no longer could a court
strike down a billboard law simply by observing that aesthetic interests
produced the law. 37 However, four of those seven justices restricted
the ban to commercial billboards. These four justices rejected the rational basis test proposed by Tobriner where noncommercial signs
were affected. 38 That decision left only three justices who, following
Tobriner, would have upheld a ban on all billboards, .commercial or
noncommercial. The next Part begins the inquiry into whether commercial and noncommercial signs should be distinguished, by analyzing the Metromedia opinions.
30. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
31. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
32. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
33. Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
34. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517 (citing Suffolk Outdoor Adv.
Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977)).
35. 26 Cal. 3d at 863, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
36. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).
37. The argument that the subjectivity of aesthetic judgments renders them insufficient to
outweigh free speech claims has not vanished. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 823 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. In 1984 the Court validated a city ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public
property, ruling that the city could protect its citizens from the "visual assault" created by the
accumulation of such signs. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807. The ban included noncommercial signs. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explained why both commercial and noncommercial signs could be banned under Taxpayers for Vincent even though only commercial
billboards could be banned under Metromedia: in Metromedia "[t]he private citizen's interest in
controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment." 466 U.S. at 811.
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JI. THE METROMEDIA OPINIONS
Metromedia settled very little in the law of billboards. Lower
court decisions since Metromedia have been anything but uniform.
On the one hand, ordinances less intrusive to first amendment concerns than the Metromedia ordinance have been found unconstitutional;39 but on the other hand, courts have merely applied a rational
basis test in validating ordinances that arguably present greater facial
challenges to the first amendment than did the Metromedia ordinance.40 The two lines of cases that have emerged since Metromedia,
and that now comprise the central debate over billboard law, have recognizable roots in the Metromedia opinions.41 Therefore, these opinions must be analyzed in order to understand the contemporary
debate.
The Metromedia Court considered a San Diego ordinance that
prohibited all offsite signs but permitted commercial onsite signs. The
ordinance also permitted signs within twelve specific categories such
as governmental signs, bench signs at public bus stops, commemorative historical plaques, religious symbols, for sale and for lease signs,
signs on public and commercial vehicles, signs displaying the time,
temperature, or news, and temporary political campaign signs. 42 The
Metromedia plurality protected noncommercial signs but not commercial signs, the concurring justices would have protected both commercial and noncommercial signs, and the three dissenting justices would
have protected neither.
A.

The Plurality Opinion

Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated that a city may prohibit offsite commercial signs while permitting onsite commercial
signs. Applying the test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission 43 for determining the validity of
commercial speech restrictions, Justice White observed that there
could be little doubt that the San Diego ordinance passed three of the
four criteria: that is, the regulated activity was neither unlawful nor
misleading; the city had a substantial interest in both safety and aesthetics; and the city had gone no further than necessary in trying to
meet its safety and aesthetic goals because it had not prohibited all
39. See Jackson v. City Council of Charlottesville, 659 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982). These two cases are
discussed in Part III infra.
40. See, e.g., Department ofTransp. v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873, 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984),
41. See section III.A.
42. 453 U.S. 490, 494-96 (1981) (citing San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series) (Mar.
14, 1972)).
43. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Central Hudson's four-part test indicates that government
may regulate commercial speech with wider discretion than it may regulate noncommercial
speech. 447 U.S. at 562-63.
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outdoor signs.44 As to the fourth criterion - whether the ordinance
directly advances the governmental interests - White argued:
[T]he city could reasonably conclude that a commercial enterprise - as
well as the interested public - has a stronger interest in identifying its
place of business and advertising the products or services available there
than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere.45

However, the plurality found the ordinance unconstitutional for
two reasons. First, by exempting onsite commercial signs from the
general prohibition, the ordinance favored commercial speech over
noncommercial speech, thereby inverting the Court's presumption
that the first amendment affords greater protection to noncommercial
speech.46 Noting the purposes of the ordinance - to promote safety
by eliminating signs that distract motorists and pedestrians and to preserve and improve the city's appearance-Justice White pointed out
that the city had not explained how a noncommercial sign would be
any more threatening to safety or detrimental to aesthetic concerns
than would a commercial sign.47
Second, the ordinance protected certain kinds of noncommercial
speech - those that fell within its twelve exemptions - but not other
kinds. 48 Justice White contended that while a city may treat different
categories of commercial speech differently (as long as there is a rational basis for doing so and no impermissible regulatory motive), it
may not distinguish among categories of noncommercial speech.49 A
city "may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse" 50
and thereby "control ... the search for political truth." 51
To explain further why the San Diego ordinance was unconstitutional, White argued that the ordinance did not meet the test for
"time, place, and manner" restrictions. 52 A time, place, or manner
restriction must (1) be justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, (2) be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative means for communicating the restricted information. 53 Because such restrictions fall
44. 453 U.S. at 507.
45. 453 U.S. at 512.
46. 453 U.S. at 513.
47. 453 U.S. at 513; see also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 15 (1st Cir.
1980).
48. For instance, religious symbols and historical plaques would be permitted, but a sign
bearing the message "Abortion is Murder'' would not be.
49. 453 U.S. at 514; see also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 15 (1980).
50. 453 U.S. at 515.
51. 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 530,
538 (1980)).
52. 453 U.S. at 515-16.
53. 453 U.S. at 516 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer_ Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this standard in Clark v.
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short of prohibitions and do not restrict according to content, they
generally receive a deferential level of judicial scrutiny.s4
According to Justice White, the San Diego ordinance failed requirements one and two for time, place, and manner restrictions. He
argued that the ordinance was obviously not content-neutral because it
distinguished signs as permissible or impermissible at given locations
depending upon the sign message. ss He also argued that ample alternative means were not available to the users of San Diego billboards
based on the fact that the parties had stipulated that advertisers use
billboards because other forms of advertising are "insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive."s 6 Despite these two failed requirements, Justice White upheld the ordinance's restrictions on
commercial speech. Thus, according to White, billboard laws may
discriminate against commercial signs regardless of whether adequate
alternative means of communication exist. s7
The standard for time, place, and manner restrictions has become
the test by which many billboard laws stand or fall. This has occurred
primarily because the San Diego ordinance's primary defects - favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech and favoring some
kinds of noncommercial speech over others - are easily corrected, at
least facially. That is, these defects are apparently cured by an ordinance that simply permits noncommercial as well as commercial onsite signs. A number of cases involve laws framed in this way.ss A
court asked to rule on an ordinance apparently without the primary
Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), Members of the City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984), and in Heffron v. International Socy. for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 4S2 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).
S4. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, S4 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, S2 (1987). Indeed, the
label "time, place, or manner restriction" indicates a legal conclusion by a court that the restriction is valid. Id. at S2 n.23.
SS. 4S3 U.S. at Sl6.
S6. 4S3 U.S. at Sl6 (quoting Joint Stipulation of Facts). White also relied on Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 8S (1977), which struck down a prohibition of
"for sale" signs on private residential property. Linmark deemed alternatives to "for sale" signs
"far from satisfactory" because they involved "more cost and less autonomy." 4S3 U.S. at S16
(quoting Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93). Chief Justice Burger took issue with White, claiming that
just because billboards may cost less than other media does not mean that adequate alternative
means of communication do not exist. See infra notes 8S-89 and accompanying text. This Note
expands upon Burger's position. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
S7. A number of subsequent decisions assume that an ordinance is valid by Metromedia standards if it does not facially discriminate against noncommercial speech nor favor any type of
noncommercial speech. Such decisions do not apply White's standard regarding the lack of alternative means of communication. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d
S86 (6th Cir. 1987); Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 84S F.2d 6S3 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also infra notes 138-S9, 180-8S and accompanying text.
S8. See e.g., Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 84S F.2d 6S3 (6th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v.
Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d S86 (6th Cir. 1987); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v.
City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. City Council of Charlottesville, 6S9
F.Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, S38 F. Supp. 1183 (D.
Md. 1982).
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defects of the San Diego ordinance will necessarily decide the case
based on whether the ordinance is content-neutral regarding noncommercial speech and whether ample alternative means of communication exist. Thus, the court will utilize two prongs of the standard for
time, place, and manner restrictions. However, wide disagreement exists as to what these prongs mean and when they should apply.
Justice Brennan's concurrence rejected the plurality's refusal to
protect commercial billboards, especially because noncommercial billboards would disappear also. Conversely, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stevens objected to the plurality's interpretations of contentneutrality and adequate alternative means, believing them unduly burdensome to local governments. Then-Justice Rehnquist, agreeing substantially with Justices Stevens and Burger, wrote separately to
emphasize a city's right to use its discretion in regulating aesthetics
and to attack specifically Brennan's desire to restrict this discretion.
These opinions have influenced the current debate over billboard laws.
B.

The Brennan Concurrence

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the
finding of unconstitutionality but disagreed with the plurality in two
fundamental ways. First, Brennan viewed the ordinance as a total ban
of billboards, the exemptions notwithstanding. He claimed that the
practical effect of the ordinance was "to eliminate the billboard as an
effective medium of communication." 59 Consequently, Brennan
would have struck down the ordinance because it failed a stricter standard of review, not because it granted invalid exceptions from a general ban. A city would have to show "that a sufficiently substantial
governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban, and that
any more narrowly drawn restriction, i.e., anything less than a total
ban, would promote less well the achievement of that goal." 60 Brennan would have invalidated the ordinance because San Diego did not
prove "that billboards actually impair traffic safety." 61 Moreover,
Brennan argued that San Diego did not show that its aesthetic interest
was "sufficiently substantial in the commercial and industrial areas" of
the city. 62 In Brennan's view, a city must show that billboards are
"necessarily inconsistent" with the area in which they would be
banned. 63 Prohibiting billboards would be unconstitutional except
where it is part of a comprehensive effort to improve given areas of the
city. 64
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

453 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring).
453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
453 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring).
453 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring).
453 U.S. at 531-32 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan observed that a community such
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Second, Brennan rejected the plurality's separate treatment of
commercial and noncommercial speech. He argued that Central Hudson demands stronger protection for commercial speech than the rational basis test applied by the plurality. 65 Brennan pointed out that,
under a ban on commercial billboards, a goveniment official must
sometimes determine whether a billboard is commercial or noncommercial, a difficult task for which no bright lines are available. Giving
an official such discretion "presents a real danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial speech. " 66
Brennan argued further that commercial advertisers would be able to
convey commercial messages free from regulation simply by dressing
them up with ideology. 67
Justice Brennan viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on
a communication medium because he viewed the offsite sign as a medium distinct from the onsite sign: "Unlike the on-premises sign, the
off-premises billboard 'is, generally speaking, made available to 'allcomers,' in a fashion similar to newspaper or broadcasting advertising.' " 68 If the offsite sign and the onsite sign are considered media
distinct from one another, then an ordinance eliminating offsite signs
could not be viewed as a time, place, or manner restriction. According
to Brennan, even an ordinance banning only offsite commercial signs
would be suspect because offsite noncommercial advertisers could not
sustain the billboard businesses. 69 The practical effect of such an ordinance would be to ban offsite signs.7 0
C.

The Stevens Dissent

Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Brennan that the San Diego
ordinance presented the issue of whether a total ban of billboards
would be valid. 71 Like Brennan, Stevens viewed onsite signs and billboards as two different media. 72 However, Stevens noted that while
the ordinance would eliminate the billboard industry in San Diego (as
well as the public's opportunity to advertise via billboards), there was
as Williamsburg, Virginia, which cultivates a historic "look," could easily prove an aesthetic
interest in removing billboards. Similarly, billboards are clearly inconsistent with the environ·
ment of a national park. 453 U.S. at 533-34.
65. 453 U.S. at 534 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. 453 U.S. at 536-37 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. 453 U.S. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. 453 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Joint Stipulation of Facts).
69. See 453 U.S. at 536 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring); 453 U.S. at 541 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part); see also infra Section III.C.
70. 453 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan's willingness to look at the results of
billboard laws anticipated a lower court decision that struck down an ordinance for a lack of
content-neutrality due to its practical effects, not its facial construction. See notes 189-99 and
accompanying text.
71. 453 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
72. 453 U.S. at 542-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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no evidence to suggest that the ordinance would hav:e any effect on a
property owner's use of onsite signs. 73 Stevens argued, therefore, that
the Court should have ruled on the billboard ban but denied standing
to the appellant billboard leasing companies to raise the "hypothetical
claims of onsite advertisers." 74 Herice, Stevens did not reach the issue
of whether or not the San Diego ordinance favored commercial speech
over noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, his understanding of fifst
amendment neutrality, as expressed in his Metromedia opinion, has
had a considerable impact on this debate.
Stevens agreed with the plurality that a city has a legitimate interest in regulating billboards for aesthetic purposes.75 But Stevens
would have applied a different, two-pronged test:
First, is there any reason to believe that the regulation is biased in favor
of one point of view or another, or that it is a subtle method of regulating
the controversial subjects that may be placed on the agenda for public
debate? Second, is it fair to conclude that the market which remains
open for the communication of both popular and unpopular ideas is ample and not threatened with gradually increasing restraints? 76

The Stevens test differs from the plurality's test in that (1) it asks
whether the ordinance restricts viewpoint, not content, and (2) in assessing the adequacy of alternative means, it seems to focus primarily
on the health of the communications market as a whole and not on the
specific attributes of billboard advertising as compared with the attributes of other advertising media. Unlike Justice White, Stevens considered the relative cost of billboard advertising immaterial. Stevens
concluded that the ordinance should be upheld because there was no
hint of.city bias or censorship,77 nor a basis for finding that San Diego's communications market could not provide adequate alternatives
for messages formerly on billboards. 78
For Stevens, first amendment neutrality means that government
does not "impose its viewpoint on the public or select the topics on
which public debate is permissible."79 His use of the words "view73. 453 U.S. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
74. 453 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
75. Taking issue with Brennan, Stevens argued that just as a city may ban billboards from
residential areas, so it may ban them from industrial or commercial areas.
[T]he interests served by the ban are equally legitimate and substantial in all parts of the
city.•.. The character of the environment affects property values and the quality of life not
only for the suburban resident but equally so for the individual who toils in a factory or
invests his capital in industrial properties.
453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
76. 453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
77. The billboard companies did not allege that San Diego was trying to suppress speech.
See 453 U.S. at 566 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nor did any justice in Metromedia allege this
motive.
78. 453 U.S. at 552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
79. 453 U.S. at 553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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point" and "topics" - as opposed to "content" - suggests an inquiry
more concerned with determining governmental motive than with determining the category of speech to which the regulated speech belongs. In fact, the plurality's commercial/noncommercial distinction
becomes irrelevant under the Stevens test, as does reliance on the word
"content."
Indeed, "content" may refer to viewpoint, categories of speech, or
subject matter. For the plurality, an ordinance which restricts any of
these three areas would not be "content-neutral." In objecting to the
San Diego exemption for onsite commercial speech, the plurality objected to the favoring of one category of speech over another. However, the plurality objected to the noncommercial speech exemptions
because a city may not determine the permissible subject matter for
public debate. Under Stevens' test, neither type of exemption threatens first amendment values because while each may restrict "content,"
neither restricts "viewpoint. " 80
Regarding the noncommercial exemptions, Stevens pointed out
that only four of the twelve pertain to subject matter: signs displaying
the time, temperature or news; historical plaques; religious symbols;
and temporary political campaign signs. Stevens argued that none of
these exemptions suggested that the city was choosing permissible topics for public discourse. For instance, all religious symbols were permitted. Moreover, according to Stevens, the city could reasonably
have determined that these exempted signs were either typically
smaller and hence less damaging to the appearance of the city than the
typical billboard (time or temperature signs, religious symbols, historical plaques) or more central to the core first amendment value of enhancing self-government (temporary political campaign signs). 81
With his broad interpretations of content-neutrality and adequate
alternative means, Stevens questioned why the San Diego ordinance
should be invalidated because of what it exempted, when by virtue of
these exemptions it would have had "a less serious effect on the communications market than would a total ban." 82 Thus, Stevens chided
the plurality for invalidating an ordinance not because it abridged
speech, but "because it [did] not abridge enough speech." 83

80. Early in his opinion, Stevens used the phrase "content-neutral exceptions" to refer to the
two types of exemptions provided by the ordinance. 453 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part). His use ofthis phrase suggests that although the exemptions were based at least in part on
content in a certain sense, in Stevens' view they were not "content-based" in a constitutional
sense because they were not based on viewpoint.
81. 453 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
82. 453 U.S. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
83. 453 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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The Burger Dissent

Chief Justice Burger would have applied a test virtually identical
to that proposed by Justice Stevens. Given its legitimate interests in
aesthetics and traffic safety, a city may restrict billboards if the restriction (1) is neutral with respect to viewpoint and topics for public debate, and (2) leaves open alternative means of communication. 84 For
Burger, the question of adequate alternatives hinged on whether
messages carried by billboards "can reach an equally large audience"
through other media. 85 He concluded that they could, partly because
messages carried by billboards "are not inseparable from the billboards that carry them," i.e., the messages on billboards may be conveyed in other ways. 86 While billboards may catch one's eye more
readily and may cost less than other media, such factors do not prove
that adequate alternatives do not exist. 87 Rather, those who oppose
the restriction must show that messages conveyed by billboards are
"relatively disadvantaged" compared to the messages presented by
other means. 88 Burger pointed out that the appellants in Metromedia
did not even suggest that billboards promote certain viewpoints or issues disproportionately to other media. 89
Burger's discussion of the neutrality criterion was the primary
thrust of his opinion. He attacked the plurality's argument that the
exemptions in the San Diego ordinance violated first amendment neutrality. Because there was no hint of an attempt by the city to suppress viewpoints or to favo+ one side of a public debate, Burger viewed
the exemptions as rational legislative choices "to permit a narrow class
of signs that serve special needs. " 90 He argued that "in each instance,
the city reasonably could conclude that the balance between safety and
aesthetic concerns on the one hand and the need to communicate on
the other has tipped the opposite way."91
84. 4S3 U.S. at S6Q.63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger would apply the same test regardless of whether the regulation is characterized as a time, place, or manner restriction or a total
ban with some exceptions depending in part on content. 4S3 U.S. at SS1 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
8S. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86. 4S3 U.S. S62·63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. Given the variety of media available - "newspapers, television, radio, magazines, direct
mail, pamphlets, etc." - Burger presumes that the party opposed to the restriction has the
burden of proving the inadequacy of these alternatives. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
88. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Billboards are not like pamphlets, whose characteristics make them particularly suitable for disseminating unpopular or less influential views.
See Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Coun: The Doctrine of Time, Place
and Manner Regulations of Expression, S4 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 7S7 (1986); see also Ackerley
Communications, Inc. v. Somerville, 692 F. Supp. 1, 21 (D. Mass. 1988), revd. on other grounds,
878 F.2d Sl3 (1st Cir. 1989).
89. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. 4S3 U.S. at SSS (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. 4S3 U.S. at S6S (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This is the type of balancing that Brennan
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Burger indicated that exemptions for certain signs have justification apart from the general right of governments to exercise their police-power: "For each exception, the city is either acknowledging the
unique connection between the medium and the message conveyed ...
or promoting a legitimate public interest in information."92 Burger
cited the argument in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro that a "for sale" sign derives its meaning and efficacy from the
site on which it is located. 93 Burger's reasoning can also be applied to
historical plaques, which give a particular designation to a given site,
and to onsite signs, which identify a premises or advertise products or
services available on a premises. An exception for such signs would be
justified because such signs are arguably the only means of conveying a
given message. For example, a sign identifying a given site cannot be
replaced by a television advertisement telling the viewer how to get to
the site. An identifying sign tells one that one has arrived at a given
site, not how to get there. 94 Therefore, the exemption for onsite signs
rests on a difference in kind between billboards and onsite signs. 95
By contrast, exempted signs that merely promote a legitimate public interest in information cannot be distinguished from billboards in a
material way. These signs do not convey messages that cannot be conveyed by other media. Moreover, presumably the public would have
an equal interest in the information provided by signs in this category
would leave to the courts, 453 U.S. at 538 (Brennan, J., concurring), and White would permit
only where the regulator is choosing between types of commercial speech. 453 U.S. at 514 (plurality opinion). Burger's emphasis on "special needs" differs from Stevens' rationale for most of
the nonco=ercial exemptions based on subject matter. Stevens asserted that a city could rea·
sonably conclude that signs such as religious symbols, historical plaques, and time, temperature,
or news signs were usually smaller than a billboard and therefore were usually less damaging to
the environment and less distracting to motorists. 453 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part). Hence, Stevens justified these three noncommercial exemptions in terms of the stated
purposes of the ordinance.
92. 453 U.S. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. 453 U.S. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil·
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)).
94. Lucking, supra note 6, at 194. Any additional information on an identifying sign that
advertises goods and services available on the site, of course, could be replaced more easily by a
television advertisement. But it may be difficult to prove that such additional information creates
an aesthetic or safety concern greater than that posed by the sign itself. See H & H Operations,
Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981). Moreover, an ordinance that
allowed advertising of names but not of products and services would be disproportionately bur·
densome to smaller and less well-known establishments whose names do not conjure up in the
minds of prospective.' consumers the products and services provided by these establishments. See
John Donnelly & i::)ns v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J., concurring).
However, under the: analysis of either Stevens or Burger, a city or state could conceivably offer
reasonable justifications for allowing information that identifies a premises while prohibiting in·
formation that advertises goods and services.
95. Both Brennan and Stevens seem to support the view that onsite and offsite signs are two
different media. See 453 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., concurring); 453 U.S. at 542-44 (Stevens, J,,
dissenting in part). However, they do not emphasize that the identifying nature of onsite signs
makes them impossible to replace by alternative means.
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and by billboards.96 Therefore, Burger's defense of the noncommercial exemptions provided by the San Diego ordinance must ultimately
rest on the discretionary right of the city. Indeed, Burger did not argue that the exempted signs were inherently more valuable than billboards. Rather, his characterization of the exempted signs - that
they pertain merely to factual information and to subject matter about
which there can be no rational debate97 - was designed to show that
there could be no threat to the first amendment in permitting the city
to exempt such signs.9s
Without discretionary exemption power, according to Burger, a
city cannot effectively combat the problems presented by billboards.
Burger claimed that the plurality, in denying the constitutionality of
narrowly defined exceptions, left the city with a choice between two
equally unsatisfactory alternatives: (1) banning all signs, or
(2) prohibiting certain commercial signs but permitting all noncommercial signs, no matter what their effect on the environment. 99
Moreover, Burger noted that the plurality seemed to indicate that it
would invalidate a complete ban of billboards. 100 Hence, a city actually would have only the one choice of permitting all noncommercial
signs. 101 For Burger, to leave a city with such limited options is to be
"insensitiv[e] to the impact of ... billboards on those who must live
with them and the delicacy of the legislative judgments involved in
regulating them."102
Burger attacked the plurality's application of the principle that
noncommercial speech reeeives greater constitutional protection than
does commercial speech. Unlike the plurality, Burger distinguished
statutory protection from constitutional protection. Once an ordinance passes the more rigid constitutional test for restricting noncom96. Indeed, under various theories bf the first amendment, there is arguably a public interest
in all information. The larger the pool of information, the greater chance there is that true or
useful information has not been suppressed. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (asserting society's strong interest in "the free
flow of commercial information"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market").
97. 453 U.S. at 564-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98. Of course, one can argue that the threat to the first amendment is not in permitting such
signs but in prohibiting others.
99. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. 453 U.S. at 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
101. Subsequent cases seem to indicate that this choice would not be ineffective. Though a
city may have to permit all noncommercial signs, such permission is not necessarily protection,
for noncommercial messages cannot support the billboard industry. See infra note 194 and accompanying text and supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Still, while most noncommercial
billboards would be eliminated simply by the elimination of commercial billboards, where noncommercial billboards are protected per se, individual cases involving particularly intrusive noncommercial billboards could not be addressed by the state. See infra note 213 and accompanying
text.
102. 453 U.S. at 556 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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mercial speech, the regulating body may reasonably decide to provide
greater statutory protection to certain commercial speech. 103 This decision would not necessarily mean that a city had placed a greater
value on commercial speech generally. 104 Indeed, a city could have
independent grounds for granting an exemption for commercial
speech. Moreover, Burger turned to his own advantage the plurality's
argument that while a city may distinguish between various types of
commercial speech, it may not do so with respect to noncommercial
speech. 105 "[W]hen adequate alternative channels of communication
are readily available ... a city arguably is more faithful to the Constitution by treating all noncommercial speech the same than by attempting to impose the same classifications in noncommercial as it has in
commercial areas." 106 Burger went on to anticipate a first amendment
challenge raised in subsequent cases: namely, that to extend the onsite
exemption to noncommercial signs would be to favor the views of
those who own noncommercial property in commercial districts. 101
Burger concluded that "a city should be commended, not condemned,
for treating all noncommercial speech the same."1os
Burger's argument assumes that the San Diego ordinance passes
constitutional muster regarding noncommercial speech. But the plurality did not reach the issue of whether a total ban of outdoor advertising signs is constitutional. 109 However, the plurality opinion does
suggest that (absent the noncommercial exemptions) the ordinance
might have been valid had it extended the onsite exemption to noncommercial signs: "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it
cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages .... " 110
Burger pointed out that by the plurality's own assertion - that a city
may not balance noncommercial communicative interests within the
same communications medium - onsite noncommercial signs may
not be favored over offsite noncommercial signs.111
103. 453 U.S. at 567 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
104. 453 U.S. at 568 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105. 453 U.S. at 568-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing 453 U.S. at 514).
106. 453 U.S. at 568 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
107. 453 U.S. at 568 n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see infra notes 195, 208 and accompanying text.
108. 453 U.S. at 569 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger does not explain how the San Diego
ordinance can be said to treat all noncommercial speech the same when it grants exemptions to
certain types of noncommercial signs.
109. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20.
110. 453 U.S. at 513. Subsequent cases have interpreted Metromedia to mean that an ordinance would be valid if the onsite exemption were extended to noncommercial signs. See e.g.,
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987); Major Media of the South·
east, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Bal ti·
more, 538 F.Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982); see also infra notes 138-59, 180-85, 187-96 and
accompanying text.
111. Arguably, one does not favor one type of noncommercial speech over another when one
exempts onsite signs because theoretically an onsite sign could convey an infinite number of
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The Rehnquist Dissent

Justice Rehnquist agreed "substantially'' with the Stevens and
Burger dissents but wrote separately to stress that in his view a city's
aesthetic interest alone is strong enough to justify a ban on billboards,
and that none of the exemptions granted by San Diego rendered the
ordinance invalid. 112 In response to Justice Brennan, he argued that
all communities, whether already beautified (Williamsburg) or still unsightly (older parts of major cities) "should not be prevented from raking steps to correct, as best they may, mistalces of their
predecessors." 113 Additionally, Rehnquist asserted that no real alternative exists to granting a local government the freedom to enforce
aesthetic judgments:
Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to believe that a judge.
is in any better position than a city or county commission to make decisions in an area such as aesthetics. Therefore, little can be gained in the
area of constitutional law, and much lost in the process of democratic
decisionmaking, by allowing individual judges in city after city to second-guess such legislative or administrative determinations.1 14

Brennan's position was that neither judge nor local government may
enforce aesthetic judgments except where the government has demonstrated a comprehensive plan to improve appearances. 115 But Rehnquist's response implies that Brennan's position is an aesthetic
judgment imposed upon local government: the judgment that in the
case of billboards local aesthetic interests fail to outweigh first amendment values except in atypical communities.
F. Summary of Metromedia
To summarize Metromedia: First, the plurality held that commercial signs could be prohibited and that onsite commercial signs could
be exempted from this prohibition. Second, as to whether noncommessages depending on the occupant of the land on which the sign is placed. See infra notes 14445 and accompanying text. Additionally, an ordinance that permits onsite noncommercial signs
but not olfsite noncommercial signs could be justified, despite the plurality's rule against balancing noncommercial speech interests within a given medium, by viewing onsite signs as comprising a distinct medium from olfsite signs. This is something the plurality was unwilling to do.
But see supra notes 68 and 72 and accompanying texts for arguments by Justice Brennan and
Justice Stevens to the contrary.
Moreover, an ordinance that balances different noncommercial communicative interests
might also be justified under the theory espoused by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens:
namely, that noncommercial speech may be excepted if the exception does not favor one side of a
public debate. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
112. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, Brennan's emphasis on whether
billboards are "inconsistent" with a particular environment ignores the source of aesthetic motivation, which is a vision of what something ought to look like, not a mere acceptance of the way
it presently appears.
114. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. 453 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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mercial signs could be prohibited along with commercial signs, the
three dissenting justices said yes, the two concurring justices said no,
and the four plurality justices took no position. However, six justices
- four in the plurality and two concurring - held that noncommercial signs could not be prohibited when an exception was made either
for certain kinds of noncommercial signs or for onsite commercial
signs. Hence, a city may neither weigh the merits of different noncommercial communicative interests nor grant statutory "preference" to
commercial signs over noncommercial signs.

III.
A.

THE AFrnRMATH OF METROMEDIA

The Ambiguity of Metromedia: Two Views of
Content-Neutrality

The primary question facing the lower courts after Metromedia is
whether an ordinance is constitutional if it neither prefers one type of
noncommercial sign over any other type of noncommercial sign nor
reserves an onsite sign exemption only for commercial signs. Courts
have decided both ways. One side argues that such an ordinance is
constitutional because it lacks the defects of the San Diego ordinance.
The other side counters that despite improvements over the San Diego
ordinance, such an ordinance would still favor commercial over noncommercial speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore 11 6 and
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways 111 represent the two sides of
this debate. An analysis of these two opinions will demonstrate that
their divergence stems from an ambiguity in the plurality opinion of
Metromedia.
1.

The Baltimore Ordinance

The ordinance in Baltimore extended an onsite exemption to both
commercial and noncommercial signs: "No signs other than those
identifying the property where they are installed or identifying the use
conducted therein shall be permitted. Advertising by material or
product manufacturers shall not be permitted except as primary identification of an establishment." 118 The district court acknowledged
that the ordinance was content-neutral in the sense that noncommercial owners or occupants could "identify their premises to the same
extent" as could commercial parties. 11 9 But the court determined
that the ordinance discriminated against noncommercial speech generally because while an owner could use a sign to identify his premises,
116. 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982). The plaintiff here is the same billboard company
which brought suit against San Diego in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.
117. 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987).
118. 538 F. Supp. at 1185.
119. 538 F. Supp. at 1187.
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he could not affix a sign to his premises in order to display "his ideas
or those of others." 120 The court concluded that the Baltimore ordinance was "facially invalid'' because, like the San Diego ordinance, it
favored commercial over noncommercial speech.1 21
The court's reasoning is faulty. The basis for the finding of discrimination against noncommercial messages in Metromedia was the
fact that an onsite sign exemption was apparently granted only to
commercial owners. 122 The district court acknowledged that the Baltimore ordinance did not create this inequity. The onsite exemption
granted by the Baltimore ordinance restricted commercial and noncommercial owners equally. Both commercial and noncommercial
sign messages were restricted to the extent that they could only be
justified as a means of identifying a given premises or an activity conducted there.
The district court recognized that the Baltimore ordinance regulated signs according to their content but misunderstood the impact of
this regulation. The court also misunderstood the plurality opinion in
Metromedia, on which it based its opinion. 123 The Baltimore ordinance discriminated against speech that had no connection to the activity conducted on a given premises. Metromedia permits such
discrimination with respect to commercial speech:· onsite commercial
signs may be exempted from a general ban on commercial signs. 124
Hence, the Metromedia plurality permitted a certain kind of contentbased regulation. Nevertheless, the Baltimore court concluded that
the Baltimore ordinance was not drawri narrowly enough because it
regulated content: "The City has advanced no arguments, and there
appear to be none, why its interests in traffic safety and esthetics could
not be served by a more narrowly drawn ordinance, ·regulating size
and appearance ... [but not] content." 125 The Baltimore court failed
to recognize the different treatment afforded.to commercial and noncommercial signs by the Metromedia plurality. The requirement that
a regulation of commercial speech be narrowly drawn is the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test. 126 According to the Metromedia
plurality, this prong of the test is easily passed by a city ordinance
120. 538 F. Supp. at- 1187.
121. 538 F. Supp. at 1187.
122. The San Diego ordinance permitted any sign, commercial or noncommercial, which
identified the premises or owner of the premises where the sign was located. However, the ordinance appeared to permit onsite advertising only on commercial property. Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 n.1 (1981). Justice Brennan took issue with the plurality's
finding that this particular provision favored commercial over noncommercial speech. 453 U.S.
at 534-36 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. 538 F. Supp. at 1187.
124. 453 U.S. at 512.
125. 538 F. Supp. at 1187.
126. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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designed to prohibit billboards: "If [a] city has a sufficient basis for
believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then
obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to
solving the problems they create is to prohibit them."1 21
The Baltimore court's contention that a regulation of size and appearance alone would sufficiently serve the city's interests reflects the
position taken by Brennan in his Metromedia concurrence, 128 not the
Metromedia plurality position. The primary object of both the Baltimore and San Diego ordinances was to reduce the number of billboards,. not merely to regulate their appearance. Applying a rational
basis test, the Metromedia plurality concluded that a city could determine that permitting onsite but banning offsite commercial signs was a
reasonabie means of reducing the number of signs.129
The Baltimore ordinance did contain an implied discrepancy.
While it explicitly allowed a commercial owner to display a sign advertising his products to the extent that such advertising would be part
of the "primary identification" of his establishment, the ordinance
made no similar reference to noncommercial advertising. 130 However,
the ordinance could certainly be interpreted as granting the same limited advertising privilege to noncommercial owners. Just as a restaurant could post a sign reading "Joe's Place: Hamburgers and Fries," a
campaign headquarters could display a sign reading "Campaign to Reelect Jones" (or even "Reelect Jones"). 131 In any event, the district
court did not base its finding of discrimination on this discrepancy in
the ordinance. To be sure, a noncommercial owner could not display
a sign communicating the ideas of others, but neither could a commercial owner; nor could either owner affix a sign advertising the products
or services of others.
The question remains whether the Baltimore ordinance should
have been struck down based on Metromedia. While the ordinance
need not be read to favor commercial over noncommercial messages, it
may restrict noncommercial speech to a degree permissible only for
commercial speech. The Metromedia plurality emphasized that
Supreme Court decisions prior to Metromedia had consistently given
greater protection to noncommercial speech than to commercial
speech. 132 This emphasis suggests that an ordinance treating them
equally would be unconstitutional. Indeed, the opinion states that city
127. 453 U.S. at 508.
128. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
129. 453 U.S. at 507-12.
130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
131. See 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, the language explicitly limiting manufacturers could be taken to mean that those with noncommercial interests are to be
given greater latitude in identifying themselves.
132. 453 U.S. at 513.
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officials with discretion to favor onsite over offsite commercial signs
may not exercise similar discretion regarding noncommercial signs. 133
The fact that regulators enjoy such discretion regarding commercial
signs "does not justify prohibiting an occupant from displaying its own
ideas or those of others." 134 This language seems to put noncommercial signs beyond the reach of regulators. 135 Therefore, ordinances
that prohibit signs according to the onsite/offsite distinction or the
identifying/nonidentifying distinction must be invalid because they restrict the noncommercial use of signs by all owners or occupants. The
commercial occupant presumably may only display signs with commercial content, and even the noncommercial occupant may only display signs containing certain of his own ideas. Neither type of
occupant may display the ideas of others. The Baltimore court, defending the right of an occupant to display its "[own] ideas or those of
others," 136 appears to have been faithful to the Metromedia plurality
opinion after all. 137
2.

The Kentucky Billboard Act

However, courts faced with billboard laws virtually identical to the
Baltimore ordinance have had no difficulty finding language in the Metromedia plurality opinion to justify upholding these ordinances. In
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways 138 the Sixth Circuit validated
the Kentucky Billboard Act, which prohibits all signs within 660 feet
of highways except those signs "that contain a message relating to an
activity or the sale of a product on the property on which they are
located." 139 The coUrt quoted much of the following passage from
Justice White's opinion, culling the principle that billboard laws must
treat noncommercial and commercial signs equally:
There is a broad excep~ion for onsite commercial advertisements, but
there is no similar exception for noncommercial speech. . . . The city
does not explain how or wpy noncommercial billboards located in places
where commercial billboards are permitted would be'more threatening
to safe driving or would detract more from the beauty of the city. Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their
content to commercial messages; the city may. not conclude that [commercial messages are] of greater value than . . . noncommercial
133. 453 U.S. at 513.
134. 453 U.S. at 513.
135. In the alternative, noncommercial signs would have to be restricted under a different
rationale.
136. 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982).
137. For a case following Baltimore's interpretation of Metromedia, see Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985).
138. 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987).
139. 822 F.2d at 588 ·(quoting 603 Ky. Admin. Regs. 3:010, § 2(3) (1975));
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messages. 140
An ordinance that prohibits signs .based on the onsite/offsite distinction does not suffer from these flaws. It provides the same exception
for noncommercial signs as for commercial signs; nor does it "limit"
sign content to commercial messages or give "greater value" to commercial signs. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the San
Diego ordinance was invalidated for two specific reasons: (1) it favored onsite commercial messages over noncommercial messages, and
(2) it favored certain noncommercial messages over other noncommercial messages. 141 • Wheeler upheld the Kentucky Billboard Act because
it possessed neither defect: "The restrictions [imposed by the Act]
permit any non-commercial signs as long as they relate to an activity
on the premises." 142
It could be argued, however, that a billboard law which grants exemptions for onsite signs possesses the second defect of the San Diego
ordinance. In permitting only signs with content related to an activity
conducted on the premises, a billboard law seems to favor one category of noncommercial signs over all other noncommercial signs. 143
This position finds support in the Metromedia plurality opinion, which
noted that one of the unconstitutional noncommercial exemptions
granted by the San Diego ordinance was an exemption for signs that
"identify any piece of property and its owner." 144 But there is a difficulty in treating onsite noncommercial signs as a category of noncommercial signs which may not be favored over others. After all, the
content of onsite noncommercial signs would be as varied as the noncommercial establishments on whose premises they would be found.
Furthermore, while it may be said that an ordinance that grants onsite
exemptions favors those who own land within the purview of the ordinance, a landowner under this ordinance has less power by virtue of
owning land than he would where he could freely choose to display
any sign. True, he might decide to lease space to a billboard company
which in turn would make it available for messages of third parties,
but he might also reserve to himself the privilege of displaying a sign
carrying his ideas only. To assert that a billboard law ought not to
favor landowners over nonlandowners is nonsensical, for a billboard
must be located on someone's land. Therefore, the argument that an
exemption for noncommercial onsite signs unduly favors one kind of
noncommercial speech over others must be made at the level of the
140. 822 F.2d at 593 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513
(1981) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)).
141. 822 F.2d at 592-93.
142. 822 F.2d 'lit 593.
143. See supra note 111 and accompanying text, where Chief Justice Burger raised this
argument.
144. 453 U.S. at 514.
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individual landowner, for it is his use of noncommercial signs that is
restricted by such an exemption.
The resolution of this problem depends on one's interpretation of
the nebulous term "content-neutral." On the one hand, an exemption
for onsite signs certainly evaluates signs with regard to their content.
On the other hand, theoretically the exemption does not preclude any
given message; it simply must be displayed in the appropriate place.
Taking the latter view of content-neutrality, the Sixth Circuit in
Wheeler argued that the Kentucky Billboard Act was not directed at
the content of signs, but at their "secondary effects." 145 Therefore, it
deemed the regulations "valid place and manner restrictions." 146 The
court derived the doctrine of secondary effects from City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 147 where the Supreme Court upheld a zoning
ordinance that prohibited "adult~' theaters from locating within 1000
feet of any residential area, church, park, or school. The ordinance
had the effect of restricting adult theaters to locations within an area
constituting approximately five percent of the city's territory. 148 Despite the fact that the ordinance treated adult theaters differently from
other theaters, the Court upheld the ordinance because it was aimed at
the secondary effects of the theaters on residential neighborhoods 149
and not at the content of the films shown. 150 Writing for the Renton
majority, then-Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the ordinance did
not "appear to fit neatly into either the 'content-based' or the 'contentneutral' category." 151 But the majority concluded that the ordinance
was "completely consistent" with the Court's definition of contentneutral regulations as those that "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech." 152 By italicizing the word "justified," Rehnquist indicated that in his view a content-neutral regulation
is a regulation free of an impermissible regulatory motive. In this way
Rehnquist echoed the discussions of content-neutrality by Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger in their dissents in Metromedia: a regulation is content-neutral if it does not suppress a particular
145. 822 F.2d at 590.
146. 822 F.2d at 589-90.
147. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
148. 475 U.S. at 53.
149. The avowed purpose of the ordinance was to protect the city against the deleterious
effects of adult theaters on their surroundings. These alleged effects included crime, a decline in
retail trade and property values, and a general lessening of the quality of urban life. 475 U.S. at
48.
150. 475 U.S. at 47.
151. 475 U.S. at 47.
152. 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S., 640, 648 (1981).
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viewpoint. 153 The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Wheeler, stressing
that the purpose of the billboard act was to reduce the number of
signs, 154 not to suppress speech content: "[The] regulations apply
evenhandedly to commercial and noncommercial speech; they discriminate against no viewpoint or subject matter."155
The Renton Court emphasized secondary effects since the Renton
ordinance discriminated on its face against certain types of theaters.
The Wheeler court argued that as the billboard act did not discriminate facially or otherwise, the court had no reason to invoke the secondary effects doctrine. A more appropriate use of the doctrine would
have been to argue that even if the billboard ordinance favors one category of noncommercial speech over another, the ordinance is constitutional nevertheless because it is aimed not at sign content but at the
effects of signs on the environment. The secondary effects argument is
nothing more than a means for focusing on regulatory motive; hence,
it can be used as a way of defending regulatory choices that appear
indefensible under a strict interpretation of "content-neutral." The argument reflects a broader interpretation of content-neutrality.
Another argument for a broad reading of content-neutrality is the
defense of exemptions on the basis of countervailing interests. The
Wheeler court follows Burger's dissent in Metromedia in defending the
onsite/offsite distinction as a legislative recognition of a right "inherent" in land ownership to advertise an activity conducted on the premises.156 The right to display an onsite sign is claimed to be inherent in
land ownership (but the right to display an offsite sign is not) because
an onsite sign is confined to its location for its efficacy. 157 Because an
onsite sign identifies the premises, its message cannot be replaced by a
sign elsewhere or by a message through a different medium. 158 Therefore, it seems that onsite signs should be constitutionally protected. 159
Wheeler argued that a prohibition of all offsite signs should not be
153. 475 U.S. at 48-49; 453 U.S. at 552-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); 453 U.S. at 555
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 79, 84 and accompanying text.
154. 822 F.2d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 1987).
155. 822 F.2d at 590.
156. 822 F.2d at 591. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
157. State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P.2d 811 (1979).
· 158. See supra note 94 and accompanying text and infra note 244 and accompanying text.
159. Numerous cases support a landowner's right to post a political message on his premises,
regardless of whether this sign relates to an activity conducted on the premises. See, e.g., State v.
Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d 821 (1980). The same widespread support cannot be found for
onsite commercial messages. But Justice Brennan, when he wrote for the New Jersey Supreme
Court, recognized the uniqueness of the onsite commercial sign: "The business sign is in actuality a part of the business itself ..• and the authority to conduct the business in a district carries
with it the right to maintain a business sign on the premises subject to reasonable regulations •
• • •" United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 150, 93 A.2d 362, 365 (1952).
Other cases protect onsite signs, commercial or noncommercial. See, e.g., State v. Lotze, 92
Wash. 2d at 59, 593 P.2d at 815.
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precluded by the fact that constitutionally a regulating body probably
cannot prohibit onsite signs.
The Wheeler and Baltimore courts exhibit contrasting views as to
the meaning of content-neutrality in the context of signs, both claiming to be faithful to Metromedia. Baltimore held that all noncommercial signs must be exempted from prohibition, whereas Wheeler
permitted prohibition of noncommercial signs if the prohibition affords noncommercial signs as much protection as it affords to commercial signs. Discussion as to which interpretation comports more
fully with Metromedia will be put off until Part IV; however, the following section reveals a possible difficulty with the Wheeler rationale.
B.

The Rights of Occupants To Display Signs

Metromedia did not determine the extent of occupant rights to display signs. The Court did indicate that the government can limit an
occupant's right to display a sign where the government has a legitimate interest in aesthetics and safety. In indicating that a city could
ban offsite commercial signs while allowing onsite commercial signs,
Metromedia permits a city to deny occupants the right to display offsite commercial signs. This holding permits a city to deny a billboard
leasing company its primary source of income. Beyond this, the Court
did not indicate how else, if at all, an occupant's right to display signs
may be restricted. The Court did say that the rationale enabling a city
to favor onsite over offsite commercial signs did not permit the city to
prohibit "an occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of
others." 160 While this assertion suggests that a different rationale
might enable a city to restrict noncommercial signs, 161 Baltimore interprets this language as establishing a constitutional right to display
noncommercial signs on one's property.162
The holding in Baltimore appears to be consistent with the fact
that ordinances that prohibit political signs from residential areas
"have uniformly been held unconstitutional." 163 The uniformity of
these cases appears to be based on a conviction that occupants who are
prohibited from displaying political signs on their residential premises
do not have adequate alternative channels for communicating the
messages on these signs. 164 In Baldwin v. Redwood City, which dealt
with political campaign signs, the following rationale was given:
[M]eans of political communication are not entirely fungible; political
160. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981).
161. See supra section 111.A.2.
162. 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982).
163. State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 413, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (1980); see also Matthews v. Town
of Needham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1373 (9th
Cir. 1976).
164. Miller, 83 N.J. at 413, 416 A.2d at 827.
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posters have unique advantages. Their use may be localized to a degree
that radio anci newspaper advertising may not. With exception of handbills, they are the least expensive means by which a candidate may
achieve name recognition among voters in a local election. 165

The ordinance at issue in State v. Miller prohibited in residential
areas all signs except those identifying the occupants or the address of
a given site, those advertising the sale or rental of a given site, and
those identifying firms at work on a given site. 166 The defendant in
Miller displayed a sign reading as follows:
WELCOME!! PROSPECTIVE RESIDENTS OF LAWRENCE
BROOK GLEN[:] THIS RESIDENT AND OTHERS OF RIVA AVE.
WANT TO WELCOME YOU TO THIS FLOOD HAZARD AREA.
GOOD LUCK!! INFORMATION AVAILABLE.161

Identifying the sign as political speech, the New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed with the defendant that the sign was the only "realistic alternative for reaching prospective purchasers of homes in the affected
area." 16 8 The court went on to assert that unless a regulation withstands strict scrutiny, political speech "is and must be permitted
everywhere." 169
It must be emphasized that a noncommercial sign placed by an
occupant on the land he occupies is not an "onsite sign" as defined in
this Note (and by the court decisions addressed in this Note that use
the term) unless the sign refers to products, services, or activities related to the premises.17° Hence, the typical political campaign sign on
a front lawn would not be an onsite sign. Consequently, court decisions such as Wheeler which permit the prohibition of signs according
to a distinction between onsite and offsite signs deny to an occupant
the right to post a noncommercial sign on his or her property. Indeed,
the appellees in Wheeler wanted to display a religious or political sign
on their property within the protected area along a state highway, but
were denied a permit.111
An important question is whether Wheeler can be reconciled with
cases like Miller and Baldwin. The denial of an occupant's right to
post a political sign by the Wheeler court can be explained perhaps by
the fact that the occupant wanted to post a sign facing a highway, not
a municipal street. The Baldwin court emphasized the "local" effect a
municipal sign achieves. 172 The Miller court argued persuasively that
the residential sign at issue was the only effective means of reaching
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

540 F.2d at 1J68.
83 N.J. at 406, 416 A.2d at 823.
83 N.J. at 406, 416 A.2d at 823.
83 N.J. at 414, 416 A.2d at 827.
83 N.J. at 416, 416 A.2d at 828.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
822 F.2d 586, 588 (6th Cir. 1987).
540 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
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the defendant's intended local audience: prospective purchasers of
houses nearby. 173 In Wheeler, it could be argued, the appellees wished
merely to take advantage of a captive audience: motorists on a highway adjacent to the plaintiffs' property. Moreover, as the Wheeler
court argued, alternative means of communication were available; because the restrictions applied only to protected areas along certain
highways, political signs could be displayed elsewhere in the vicinity.
Therefore, the court found that the regulation did not deny the appellees a "reasonable opportunity" to display a political sign. 174
Wheeler cannot be reconciled with the cases concerning residential
political signs unless one can justify providing greater protection to
political signs along residential streets than to signs along certain highways. As indicated above, this added protection has been justified
when the residential sign has a "local" thrust such that other means of
communication cannot target people in the limited area. But not all
residential signs have this local thrust. Moreover, a political sign
along a highway could have greater significance to a given locale than
a particular residential sign. Therefore, there appears to be no reason
why residential political signs as a class should be (avored over political signs along a highway.11s
The operative criterion in determining whether a government may
prohibit a sign is whether alternative means of communication exist.
If alternative means are generally less available for residential signs, it
would be because residential signs tend to depend for their efficacy on
the particular premises on which they are situated. This is the primary characteristic of the onsite sign. 176 Therefore, a strong argument
could be made for exempting those residential signs with this characteristic from a general prohibition of o:ffsite signs. Of course, to make
such distinctions requires a consideration of "content" in order to assess the relationship between the message and the land on which it is
located. 177 Metromedia appears to have prohibited such an assessment
where noncommercial speech is concerned. 178 But to exempt only res173. 83 N.J. at 413-14, 416 A.2d at 827.
174. 822 F.2d at 596 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,_~75 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)).
175. The First Circuit has argued that "deprivation of highway opportunities [for communication] is not as legally objectionable as some other curtailments," for highways were created
with taxpayers' money to enhance travel, not to enhance advertising. John Donnelly & Sons v.
Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 1980). However, the argument applies equally to curtailments
along residential streets. Moreover, the First Circuit utilized this argument only in connection
with curtailments of commercial speech. 639 F.2d at 14.
176. See supra notes 10, 158 and accompanying text. It is also the primary characteristic of a
larger category of signs: identifying signs. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
177. The word "content" is in quotation marks because whether or not an assessment of
content is content-neutral is the heart of the conflict between Justice White and the dissenters in
Metromedia (see supra Part II) and between the Baltimore and Wheeler courts (see supra section
III.A).
178. The four plurality justices and the two concurring justices probably would have agreed
on this point.
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idential political ·signs from a general ban on offsite signs is even less
defensible by Metromedia standards. 179 Thus, Metromedia allows no
compromise between Wheeler and a case such as Miller.
The Sixth Circuit has also applied the Wheeler rationale to a city
ordinance. Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion 180 upheld an ordinance based on the onsite/offsite distinction. The ordinance permitted
onsite and offsite signs in the industrial district of Lake Orion but allowed only onsite signs, commercial and noncommercial, in the retail
district.181 The ordinance also created an exemption for temporary
political signs throughout the village. 182 This exemption may prevent
conflict between Rzadkowolski and Miller. Miller asserted merely that
political signs may not be excluded from residential districts.1 83 To
allow these signs at certain times is to avoid the charge of total exclusion. However, six Metromedia justices held that twelve exemptions
(including one for temporary political campaign signs) invalidated the
San Diego ordinance because they indicated a preference for one type
of noncommercial speech over others. Hence, the exemption in
Rzadkowolski should have rendered the Lake Orion ordinance invalid.
Inexplicably, the Sixth Circuit merely mentions this exemption but
does nothing to justify it.184
Moreover, a defense of Rzadkowolski must explain why offsite
political signs are only permitted on a temporary basis while onsite
commercial signs may be permanent. By Metromedia standards, this
defense cannot be made: commercial speech may not be favored over
noncommercial speech. The exemption in Rzadkowolski undercuts
the purpose of the onsite/offsite distinction: that is, to treat commercial and noncommercial signs equally. 185 This principle of equal treatment precludes exemptions. Therefore, the onsite/offsite rationale of
Rzadkowolski and Wheeler cannot protect the right of an occupant to
display a residential political sign.
If regulators want to protect the rights defended in Miller and
Baldwin (and they may be required by the Constitution to do so), it
seems they must, under the dictates of Metromedia, exempt all non179.
point.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

The four plurality justices and the two concurring justices definitely agreed on this

845 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1988).
845 F.2d at 654.
845 F.2d at 654.
83 N.J. 402, 413, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. 1980).
845 F.2d at 654. The court might have argued that unlike the exemptions in Me·
tromedia, an exemption for any temporary political sign does not favor one type of noncommercial sign over any other, for all noncommercial signs contain some "political" content for first
amendment purposes. The similar exemption in Metromedia specified that the temporary sign
had to be connected with a political campaign. 453 U.S. 490, 495 n.3 (1981). The Rzadkowolski
exemption applies to any political sign and hence does not discriminate between types of noncommercial signs.
185. Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 593 (6th Cir. 1987).
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commercial signs from sign prohibitions. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger
argued that the plurality opinion in Metromedia left regulators with a
choice between banning all signs or exempting noncommercial signs
from any prohibition of signs regardless of their impact on safety or
the environment. 186 But, as the next section shows, even when an ordinance exempts all noncommercial signs from a billboard ban,
problems remain.
C. Discriminatory Effect on Noncommercial Signs
In Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh 187 the
Fourth Circuit upheld a city ordinance that prohibited offsite commercial signs from certain zones within the city. The ordinance exempted
noncommercial signs from regulation in order "to eliminate any potential constitutionality problems." 188 Indeed, the exemption for noncommercial signs allowed the city to avoid the controversies analyzed
in section III.A and section III.B of this Note, controversies stemming
from the difficulty of determining at what point noncommercial speech
has been properly protected when commercial exemptions have been
granted. Consequently, the plaintiff billboard company in Raleigh was
compelled to argue atypically, advancing one old argument and one
new one.
The old argument had been the heart of Justice Brennan's concurrence in Metromedia: the danger of allowing a government official to
determine whether a sign is commercial or noncommercial. 189 The
plaintiff in Raleigh argued that the regulation did not provide enough
guidance to officials because it did not define "commercial" and "noncommercial."190 The Raleigh court contended that definitions were
unnecessary because the Supreme Court had already supplied them, 191
and it maintained that the "occasional marginal case" where uncertainty existed should not invalidate the regulation for vagueness. 192
The court might have added that only two Metromed(a justices, Brennan and Blackmun, were concerned with this problem.
The new argument advanced by the plaintiff in Raleigh was that
the ordinance preferred commercial speech over noncommercial
speech because the ordinance would lead to the virtual disappearance
186. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
187. 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986).
188. 792 F.2d at 1271 n.2 (quoting Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh,
621 F. Supp. 1446, 1448 (E.D. N.C. 1985)).
189. 453 U.S. 490, 536-37 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
190. 792 F.2d at 1272.
191. The Court defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Blee. v. Public Serv. Commn.,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
192. 792 F.2d at 1272-73.
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of noncommercial signs. 193 The ordinance would destroy the billboard industry, and billboards often provide the only means of displaying noncommercial signs. Thus, though the ordinance exempted
noncommercial signs from direct regulation, the ordinance indirectly
burdened noncommercial signs more than commercial signs.194
The Raleigh court stated that even if this discriminatory effect occurred, it would have derived "from decisions of the individual property owners" and not from the ordinance itself which "by its very
terms does not affect non-commercial signs." 195 Therefore, the court
argued that the city may not be held responsible for such results.196
This discriminatory effect argument (despite no facial discrimination) was urged by Justice Brennan in his Metromedia concurring
opinion. Brennan disagreed with the plurality's view that an ordinance, such as the one in Raleigh, which bans offsite commercial signs
but permits all noncommercial signs would be constitutional. 197 Despite the noncommercial sign exemption, Brennan would treat the ordinance as a total ban of offsite signs if the ban on commercial signs
resulted in a virtual ban on noncommercial signs.19 8
Only one court has struck down a billboard law due to its discriminatory effect on noncommercial speech. This decision, Jackson v. City
Council of Charlottesville, 199 invalidated an ordinance that exempted
all onsite signs, both commercial and noncommercial, but did not exempt offsite noncommercial signs. 200 The Jackson court argued that
"[w]hile the ordinance in Metromedia differs somewhat inform from
the local ordinance challenged in this case, a careful analysis of the
two ordinances shows that each reaches the same result, i.e., the virtual prohibition of noncommercial advertising . . . ." 201 While the
court admitted that the language of the ordinance permits onsite noncommercial signs, it asserted: "[C]learly the general scheme of the
sign ordinance is to prohibit all but on-premises commercial advertising."202 The court claimed, illogically, that the ordinance, despite its
facial neutrality, was unconstitutional "on its face." 203
193. 792 F.2d at 1271-73.
194. 792 F.2d at 1273.
195. 792 F.2d at 1273.
196. 792 F.2d at 1273.
197. 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
198. 453 U.S. at 536 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. 659 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987), modified on other grounds, 840 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1988).
200. The Jackson rationale, because it looks only to the result of an ordinance and not to
what it says, also could be applied to an ordinance like that in Raleigh which exempts all non·
commercial signs.
201. 659 F. Supp. at 473 n.3 (emphasis added).
202. 659 F. Supp. at 472 n.1. The word "scheme" suggests that the court suspected the city
of intending to rid itself indirectly of noncommercial signs.
203. 659 F. Supp. at 474.
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The defendant city council in Jackson argued that Metromedia
did not apply because the Charlottesville ordinance was contentneutral. 204 The court did not attempt to determine the extent to which
content-neutrality might be a function of what an ordinance says as
opposed to what it effects. Rather, the court noted the defendant's
reliance on Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, a
Supreme Court decision which upheld a city's ban of posters on public
property as a content-neutral restriction,2°5 but found this reliance
wanting: "[The] defendant's reliance on Vincent is misplaced because
the sign ordinance at issue here is not the kind of absolute prohibition
permitted by Vincent. " 206 The Jackson court thus implied that an ordinance can only be content-neutral if it constitutes an absolute prohibition. The reasoning of Vincent suggests nothing of the kind: "The
text of the ordinance is neutral - indeed it is silent - concerning any
speaker's point of view, and . . . it has been applied . . . in an evenhanded manner." 207 The above passage makes clear that content-neutrality depends upon the "text" of an ordinance and its enforcement,
not upon its indirect effects. 208 Hence, the Jackson ordinance was content-neutral.
Therefore, the discriminatory effect argument cannot disturb the
essence of the Raleigh holding: a billboard law is valid if it exempts all
noncommercial signs. The Jackson court might have pointed out that,
strictly speaking, the holding in Metromedia depended not on the San
Diego ordinance's lack of content-neutrality, but rather on its preference for commercial over noncommercial signs.209 It would then have
been possible to assert that impermissible favoring of commercial
speech can occur despite content-neutrality due to the impact of an
ordinance. Indeed, something is amiss when a court can accept both a
fundamental principle - noncommercial speech deserves greater protection than commercial speech - and results inconsistent with the
principle. Metromedia forced this result by simultaneously adhering
to the principle and asserting a city's right to reduce the number of
outdoor signs. As Jackson demonstrates, and as Brennan's Metromedia argument implied, if one seriously intends to protect noncommercial signs, one must protect commercial billboards. But, by
the same logic, if governments have the right to prohibit some billboards for aesthetic purposes, then the principle of affording greater
204. 659 F. Supp. at 473.
205. 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
206. 659 F. Supp. at 473.
207. 466 U.S. at 804.
208. The ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres was also deemed content-neutral
despite the fact that, due to financial constraints, the adult theater in question would most likely
be unable to relocate in the only section of the city left open to it. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). But see
Renton, 415 U.S. at 64-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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protection to noncommercial speech should not apply to billboard
laws. Part IV makes this argument.
IV.

JUSTIFYING PROHIBITIONS AND EXEMPTIONS

We have seen that the Metromedia plurality did not draw a clear
line between those signs that could be prohibited and those that could
not be. Metromedia appears to support two divergent views on the
matter. One view draws the line between commercial and noncommercial signs. The other permits prohibition of noncommercial signs
if the ordinance affords noncommercial signs at least as much protection as it affords commercial signs. As shown above in section III.A,
these two views rest on divergent notions of "content-neutrality." The
commercial/noncommercial distinction disallows restrictions on noncommercial signs that in any way depend on what a sign says or what
function the sign serves. The opposing view - reflected in both the
onsite/o:ffsite distinction and the identifying/nonidentifying distinction - requires only that the restriction not discriminate according to
point of view or subject matter. For instance, the narrow view of content-neutrality would not permit an exemption for any class of sign,
even if the class potentially includes any message from any point of
view, because a sign's content would have to be assessed in order to
determine its class. Conversely, the broader view of content-neutrality
would allow an exemption for a class of signs - onsite signs (or identifying signs) - as long as every sign within that class was exempt.
This Part, in evaluating the commercial/noncommercial distinction
and the onsite/o:ffsite distinction as principles by which to justify
prohibitions of signs and exemptions from these prohibitions, argues
that neither distinction proves adequate. This Part then advocates a
third distinction as the most appropriate standard: a distinction between signs that identify the premises on which they are located and
signs that do not.

A. Inadequacies of the Commercial/Noncommercial Distinction
The benefits in employing the commercial/noncommercial distinction are plain: (1) it stresses the principle that noncommercial speech
should be afforded greater protection than commercial speech; (2) it
avoids the inevitable constitutional disputes arising from favoring one
kind of noncommercial speech over another; (3) it avoids the difficulty
of justifying favoring one type of noncommercial speech over another;
and (4) it does not thwart the government objective of limiting outdoor display signs, for noncommercial billboards are virtually eliminated indirectly when commercial billboards are prohibited.2 10 Thus,
210. See supra notes 69, 194 and accompanying text. Of course, this fourth benefit is only
considered such by someone who believes the aesthetic objectives of sign prohibitions outweigh
the countervailing free speech claims.
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the commercial/noncommercial distinction seems to yield the best of
all possible solutions for a court hoping to strike a compromise: it
maintains the principle that noncommercial (political) speech is especially valuable while allowing governments to eliminate virtually all
offsite signs. But the principled protection for political speech rings
hollow when courts rely conveniently on market forces to accomplish
indirectly what they will not do directly. 211 Additionally, the commercial/noncommercial distinction may not even satisfy those who
would prohibit signs on aesthetic grounds, for the exemption of all
noncommercial signs from prohibition presents a host of potential regulatory problems.
A compromise that depends on something as changeable as market
forces is precarious. If these forces change, allowing billboard companies to thrive on noncommercial messages, the governmental objective
to improve appearances by prohibiting billboards will be utterly
thwarted. Justice Brennan noted that if commercial entities want to
utilize billboards where commercial signs have been prohibited, they
will circumvent the commercial/noncommercial distinction with noncommercial messages designed to advertise their names and products. 212 However it may happen, noncommercial billboards could
spring up in great numbers where governments had previously removed the perceived blight of commercial billboards. The subsequent
blight will be no less perceptible by virtue of its noncommercial content. Governments and courts will then be restrained from acting by
Metromedia (and one branch of its progeny), which failed to face directly the conflict between governmental interests and communicative
interests presented by the billboard, commercial or noncommercial.
But even if noncommercial billboards never present a problem due
to their numbers, the exemption for all noncommercial signs ensures
that these signs cannot be prohibited no matter how intrusive they are
to aesthetic interests and no matter what their location, message, or
function. 213 Obviously, government cannot routinely protect citizens
from unpleasant speech. The maintenance of free speech requires that
offensive speech must often be tolerated. 214 But offensive speech need
not be tolerated under all circumstances;215 and a number of factors
indicate that signs should receive less protection than other media.
The Supreme Court has observed that billboards "are constantly
before the eyes of observers on the streets ... to be seen without the
211. Despite assertions to the contrary, Metromedia did not protect noncommercial billboards. See supra section 111.C.
212. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
213. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
214. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
215. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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exercise of choice or volition on their part," and that their messages
are "thrust upon [observers] by all the arts and devices that skill can
produce."216 Unlike advertisements in magazines and newspapers,
which are seen only after some effort by the reader to turn the pages,
or on the radio, which can be turned off, billboard messages cannot be
avoided. 217 Signs are intended to catch one's eye. When something
new, offensive, large, or unusual comes into view, one simply looks. If
one then chooses to look away, one does so knowing the sign is there.
This presence compels its audience either to include it in its gaze or to
forfeit the opportunity to look in that general direction.
Dissenting in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonvil/e, 218 Chief Justice
Burger argued similarly that passers-by offended by nudity on a drivein movie screen plainly visible from the street should not have the
burden of having to look away. 219 But if this argument failed in
Erznoznik, where the city ordinance clearly intended to control the
content of the movies shown,220 it should prevail where sign prohibitions target only the signs themselves and not their content. For this
reason, Professor John Costonis has argued that first amendment values are not "seriously threatened" by billboard bans. 221 Noting that in
Metromedia Justice White distinguished between a billboard's "communicative and non:communicative. aspects," 222 and that no justice
took issue with that distinction, Costonis argues that the justices
should have denied first amendment protection to billboards by regarding them as "aesthetic entities" and not speech.223 Costonis
points out that no one disputed that San Diego opposed billboards
because they "were perceived as associationally dissonant with San Diego's character," and not because of the messages they conveyed. 224
In addition to producing the twin problems of exempting noncommercial signs regardless of their effects and failing to protect noncommercial signs despite the appearance of doing so, the commercial/
noncommercial distinction fails to address the question whether adequate alternative means exist for a given sign. Thus, the commercial/
noncommercial distinction produces legislation blind to the unique
needs of particular individuals who want to display a sign. 22s
It matters a great deal where certain signs are placed. A stop sign
216. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932).
217. 285 U.S. at 110.
218. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
219. 422 U.S. at 218-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
220. 422 U.S. at 206-07.
221. Costonis, supra note 3, at 449 n.336.
222. 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981).
223. Costonis, supra note 3, at 447-48.
224. Id. at 448. However, emphasizing associational dissonance (or inconsistency) has its
drawbacks. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for Burger's discussion of "special needs."
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is useless unless placed where the government requires cars to stop.
The efficacy of other signs does not depend on their location, at least
not in the same way. An offsite commercial sign along a highway that
advertises services and goods available at a given exit must be placed
prior to the exit but may be placed at any of a large number of such
sites. A noncommercial sign asking for donations to a particular cause
will naturally be most effective in a location where the most people
will see it (or where the most people prone to making a donation will
see it), but, again, such a sign need not be displayed at any particular
place. It conveys its message regardless of its location. Conversely,
like the stop sign, the onsite sign (or the identifying sign) must be displayed in a particular place because its function is to identify that
place in some way, to tell its viewer that he has arrived at a given
place.226
The commercial/noncommercial distinction implies that the right
to display a noncommercial sign is a right concomitant with owning or
occupying prop~rty. 227 But ifthere is a right to display a sign concomitant with owning or occupying, property, this right should extend to
commercial signs. The Metromedia plurality, in granting San Diego
the discretion to value some commercial communicative interests over
others, 228 theoretically granted the discretion to prohibit onsite commercial signs under certain circumstances. The storeowner denied the
right to advertise his store with an onsite sign will receive little consolation in learning that he may substitute any noncommercial message
he wishes for his ill-fated onsite sign. To assert in this case that noncommercial speech must receive greater protection than commercial
speech under the first amendment229 is to blind oneself to gross inequity. Although regulators may be unlikely to deny storeowners their
onsite signs, the fact that they could reveals the inherent inadequacy of
the commercial/noncommercial distinction to justify prohibitions in
the case of signs: it takes no account of the function a sign performs.
Similarly, the commercial/noncommercial distinction cannot explain why a government may display traffic signs but not political
signs. If "owning" or possessing land creates a right to display noncommercial signs thereon, a government should be able to display any
noncommercial message where it displays traffic signs. But this is obviously not the case. Government may not "control ... the search for
political truth." 230 If a city challenged the.state's right to display traffic signs within the city, a court undoubtedly would justify the traffic
226. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
228. 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
229. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513.
230. 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S.
530, 538 (1980)).
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signs in terms of the function they perform. The court would probably
find both that the state had a compelling interest in dfrecting motorists
and that the state was not attempting to influence public debate. 231
Moreover, when ownership or occupancy of property triggers the
right to display noncommercial signs, it is impossible to distinguish
between the rights of billboard companies and the rights of residents.
A billboard company owns or leases the space on which it displays
signs to the same degree as a resident owns or leases his property.
However, cases such as Baldwin and Miller 232 support our intuitive
sense that the homeowner has a greater speech right than the billboard
company where signs are concerned. What explains this intuitive
sense? First, the homeowner generally displays his own messages, not
the messages of others. Second, the homeowner usually lives where he
displays his sign; he must tolerate, along with his neighbors, any unpleasant side effects of his sign. 233 Third, and most important to Baldwin and Miller, the homeowner may have no means other than his sign
to further his communicative interest. 234 Determinations made under
the commercial/noncommercial distinction ignore these three factors.
As the foregoing examples indicate, the commercial/noncommercial distinction takes no account of whether ample alternative means
of communication are available to someone wishing to display a sign.
Indeed, the Metromedia plurality permitted San Diego to prohibit certain commercial signs despite admitting that alternative means appeared to be unavailable. 235 The storeowner's identifying sign is
essentially irreplaceable,236 yet in theory it is not protected. Conversely, the commercial/noncommercial distinction obliges governments to protect each noncommercial sign regardless of the fact that
its message could be conveyed through another medium.
In justifying the commercial/noncommercial distinction, one
might stress the difficulty in defining "ample alternative means." If
Metromedia is any indication, the phrase represents a conclusion as to
the validity or invalidity of an ordinance rather than a standard by
which to judge that validity.237 Justice White merely relied on a joint
statement of the parties to the effect that people use billboards because
they are relatively inexpensive and efficient. 238 But, presumably, cost
231. By contrast, the reasoning of the Metromedia plurality suggests that if the government
chooses to erect directional signs, it cannot deny anyone else the right to erect any noncommer·
cial sign. To conclude otherwise is to favor one type of noncommercial speech over any other.
232. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
233. Naturally, the neighbors are more likely than the sign displayer to find the side effects
unpleasant or unjustifiable.
234. See section III.B.
235. 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981).
236. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
238. 453 U.S. at 516.
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and efficiency influence any choice of medium. We would hardly be
surprised to find that people have practical reasons for selecting the
medium they select. Therefore, accepting cost and efficiency as standards could easily result in a finding that ample alternative means
never exist.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres held that only a "reasonable
opportunity" to communicate in another way need be available and
that financial limitations alone do not entitle one to utilize the preferred alternative. 239 However, financial limitations coupled with a
general inability to reach an audience can be sufficient to protect a
means of communicating "the poorly financed causes of little people.''240 Chief Justice Burger argued that inadequate alternatives exist
only when a party can demonstrate that his message is relatively disadvantaged compared to the messages conveyed by other means.241
At least in the case of signs, this standard seems too limited, for it
would ignore the problem of the storeowner denied an onsite sign.
Having the financial means to advertise does not solve his problem.
Neither the ample alternative means test nor the reasonable opportunity test provide assistance to a court unless they mean tp.at a sign
displayer, in order to qualify for the court's protection, must show that
he has either (1) financial limitations coupled with a general inability
to reach an audience, or (2) an identifying sign. Consequently, this
test should be the test for whether ample alternative means of communication exist. In effect, a court should ask not whether ample alternatives exist, but whether any alternatives exist.
·
Of course, it may also be quite unreasonable for a government to
prohibit certain nonidentifying signs. But if the prohibitfon is unreasonable, it would be for reasons other than a lack of ample alternative
means of communication. For instance, Baldwin v. Redwood City argued that residential political campaign signs have a local objective
that cannot be accomplished readily by other means. 242 But Baldwin
acknowledged that handbills also would have accomplished the sign
displayer's objective. 243 For that matter, going door-to-door may be
the most effective way to reach a local audience. What rendered these
alternatives inadequate? Apparently, the court simply concluded that
people should have the right to. display such signs; that they should
not have to hand out leaflets or walk d<?or-to-door. One might argue
that political lawn signs have long been used, or that such signs represent active participation in the democratic process. But a court cannot
logically base this right on a lack of alternative means, for "ample"
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). .
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
453 U.S. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See supra note 165 and accompanying text..
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means nothing in this context. If alternatives exist, by definition they
must be ample, for cost and efficiency cannot be considered (unless the
inquiry is whether or not the complainant's sign furthered a poorly
financed cause "of little people").
B.

The Superiority of the Identifying/Nonidentifying Distinction

Section IV.A indicates that the commercial/noncommercial distinction is inappropriate because it does not consider a sign's function
or its relationship to the land on which it is displayed. Thus, it ignores
the only measure by which to determine whether alternative means of
communication exist for someone who wants to display a sign. The
onsite/o:ffsite distinction is superior to the commercial/noncommercial distinction because, in protecting onsite signs, it takes a sign's
function into account. Additionally, the onsite/o:ffsite distinction
gives greater leeway to local aesthetic interests, allowing governments
to ban all o:ffsite signs. In contrast, the commercial/noncommercial
distinction removes aesthetic consideration from a court's determination: it protects each noncommercial sign regardless of whether it is
more offensive or intrusive aesthetically (given its placement) than a
commercial sign.
Although the onsite/offsite distinction is preferable to the commercial/noncommercial distinction, it fails to include other signs that
should be protected under the rationale needed to protect onsite signs.
Onsite signs deserve protection from sign bans because, as they identify the premises on which they are displayed, they cannot be replaced
by an alternative means of communication.244 Therefore, all identifying signs - not just onsite signs - should be protected.
Recall that an onsite sign is a sign that refers to or identifies the
activities conducted, the services provided, or the products sold or dispensed on the premises. 245 Therefore, the onsite/o:ffsite distinction
would not protect "for sale" or "for lease" signs unless the property
were considered a product sold on the premises.246 Nor would it protect political signs such as the sign in Miller whose message required
for its conveyance that the sign be disl'layed on a given premises. 247
244. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
246. It might be argued that the definition for onsite signs could easily be amended so as to
include "for sale" signs; hence, "for sale" signs as a class of signs do not demonstrate the need for
the identifying/nonidentifying distinction. But "for sale" signs may be divided into two types:
the signs placed on property in order to entice would-be purchasers to inquire on the premises
and the signs that direct would-be purchasers to another location for information. The former
might very well be deemed onsite signs, but not the latter. In either case the signs identify a piece
of property for sale (or lease). Therefore, it would be impractical and inequitable for a regulntion
to permit one type but not the other, and yet this would be the result of the application of the
onsite/offsite distinction.
247. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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Signs that identify the occupant of the premises and not the premises itself create a separate problem. The onsite/offsite distinction
would not protect a residential sign indicating the occupant's name.
Nor would it protect a sign identifying the firm engaged in construction or other work on the premises on which it is located. One avoids
this problem by recognizing the identifying sign as the category of sign
requiring protection. Signs that identify the occupants of a premises
also identify the premises.
By extension; it might then be argued that the political campaign
sign on a front lawn should be protected because it identifies the occupants as being people who intend to vote for a particular candidate,
and thereby identifies the premises. But two difficulties arise from this
reasoning. First, the political campaign sign communicates information about the occupant that cannot be said in turn to indicate anything integral to the premises. By contrast, a sign that names an
occupant or owner provides what might be termed "primary identifi.cation"248 of the premises; it provides one of the basic pieces of information to be learned about a tract ofland: who lives or works there or
who owns it. Most importantly, the sign that names the occupant of
the premises tells its viewer that he has arrived at a given place. It
would be an unusual political sign, such as the sign in Miller, which
would serve this function.
Second, to include political campaign signs among signs that identify premises would be to include any residential political sign in this
group, ·for every residential political sign is intended to indicate an
occupant's perspective on some issue. The distinction between signs
that identify a given premises and signs that do not would lose significance if it were expanded to include every sign that indicates something about the occupant of the land on which the sign is located. If
political signs are to be protect~, they must be protected under a different rationale. 249
The foregoing makes clear that the best justification for exempting
signs from a general ban is the distinction between signs that identify
premises and signs that do not. 250 At bottom, this distinction is a measure by which to determine whether ample alternative means of communication exist. The distinction stems from the fact that an
identifying sign cannot be replaced by another medium. Like the on248. See discussion in section III.A of Baltimore, in which a city ordinance distinguished
onsite signs from offsite signs by permitting only those signs which provided "primary identification" of a premises.
249. Because the identifying/nonidentifying distinction functions according to a broad view
of content-neutrality, it is consistent with permitting governments to exempt certain nonidentifying signs from a general ban for independent reasons. Infra note 2S9 and accompanying text.
Metromedia, 4S3 U.S. 490, SSS (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
2SO. Essentially, this was the standard San Diego intended to employ. Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 8S8 n.6, 610 P.2d 407, 411 n.6, 164 Cal. Rptr. SlO, Sl4 n.6.
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site/offsite distinction, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction cannot be reconciled with a strict view of content-neutrality, for it
necessarily favors identifying content over nonidentifying content. As
has been shown, certain courts have reconciled the onsite/offsite distinction with the Metromedia holding, though not without difficulty.251 These difficulties become more pronounced when the
identifying/nonidentifying distinction is applied.
First, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction repudiates the Metromedia plurality's claim that it matters whether a sign's message is
commercial or noncommercial. Second, while Metromedia arguably
may not require an exemption for all noncommercial signs, it assuredly did not permit evaluating signs according to their functions. Indeed, the Metromedia plurality included signs "used to identify any
piece of property and its owner" in a catalogue of invalid noncommercial exemptions.252 Recognizing that Metromedia took no account of
a sign's function, the First Circuit in Matthews v. Town ofNeedham 253
found the onsite/offsite distinction invalid precisely because it rests on
a preference for signs based on the function they perform. The court
argued that "preference for the 'functions' of certain signs over those
of other (e.g., political) signs is really nothing more than a preference
based on content."254 Despite language in the Metromedia plurality
opinion suggesting the plausibility of an interpretation justifying the
onsite/offsite distinction, 255 this interpretation ultimately breaks
down. Therefore, the commercial/noncommercial distinction appears
to be more consistent with Metromedia than the onsite/offsite
distinction. 256
C. Implications of Accepting the Identifying/Nonidentifying
Distinction

This Note has argued that a city or state may not prohibit identifying signs because these signs are the only signs that cannot be replaced
by alternative communicative means. No medium but an identifying
sign can tell the viewer that he has arrived at a particular place or that
the land or property he views has certain characteristics. However,
this Note does not argue that if a government wants to ban signs, it
must ban all but identifying signs in order to observe standards of
equal protection.
The identifying/nonidentifying distinction functions according to
the broad view of content-neutrality espoused by Stevens and Burger
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
453 U.S. at 514.
764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985).
764 F.2d at 60 (emphasis omitted).
453 U.S. at 503, 508, 512-13.
See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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in their Metromedia dissents. According to this view, a government
may prohibit signs as long as the prohibition does not discriminate
against viewpoint or against controversial subject matter, and as long
as ample alternative means of communication are available. 257 The
identifying/nonidentifying distinction regulates according to content,
favoring identifying content over nonidentifying content. But this reliance on content does not reflect an attempt to control public debate by
prohibiting or exempting signs conveying controversial subjects. Indeed, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction merely provides a
standard for determining whether adequate alternative means exist,258
the second prong of the Stevens/Burger test.
As both Stevens and Burger argued, a state or city may have independent reasons for exempting certain nonidentifying signs from a
general ban.259 For instance, a state might reasonably decide to ban
billboards along highways generally but permit government signs conveying information especially useful to motorists, such as notice of
food, gas, or lodging at upcoming exits. Or, for aesthetic reasons, a
city might reasonably distinguish temporary signs from permanent
signs, or signs in residential areas from signs in commercial areas. Or,
a city might permit residential lawn signs of any kind, believing the
usefulness of such signs to displayer and viewer in a local area outweighs the aesthetic interest in banning them.
Of course, there must exist a rational connection between the regulation and its purpose. A city that exempts commercial nonidentifying
signs but does not exempt noncommercial nonidentifying signs could
not give a reasonable justification in light of its goals to improve the
city's appearance. If one type of noncommercial nonidentifying sign is
exempted while another type of noncommercial nonidentifying sign is
not, the ordinance is invalid if it suppresses a point of view or controversial subject matter or if there is no reasonable justification for favoring one type of sign.
The identifying/nonidentifying distinction would substantially reduce the dangers of granting discretion to billboard regulators. With
the protection of identifying signs secured, 'the benefits to aesthetic interests from utilizing the Stevens/Burger test would easily compensate
257. The facial difference between Stevens' test and Burger's is that Burger disallows a restriction based on "topics for public debate" while Stevens disallows a restriction based on "controversial subject matter." This difference is merely facial, as both justices would allow
"discrimination" according to subject matter when the government has no hidden motive of
suppressing speech. Hence, both justices would permit an exemption for the "topic" or "subject
matter' conveyed by "for sale" signs. See supra notes 80, 90 and accompanying text. Indeed,
"for sale" signs would not be protected under a narrow view of content-neutrality which disallows restrictions based on subject matter.
258. While this Note argues to the contrary, see supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text,
one could argue that alternative means might be inadequate for some nonidentifying signs. Even
so, identifying signs have a special claim to first amendment protection.
259. See supra notes 81, 91 and accompanying text.
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for whatever negligible discretionary dangers remain. For instance,
the Stevens/Burger test would enable a city to exempt temporary (or
permanent) political campaign signs, an impossible result if identifying
signs constitute the only permissible exemptions. Freed from an unworkable notion of "content-neutrality," a city would be able to grant
reasonable exemptions based on a determination that a given communicative interest outweighs the city's aesthetic interest,260 but avoid the
allegation that it acted unconstitutionally because it did not "abridge
enough speech."261 Within the limits imposed by viewpoint neutrality
and the identifying/nonidentifying distinction, a city with discretion
to make aesthetic judgments may approach the problem of billboard
regulation with the flexibility or "delicacy" the problem requires. 262
As Rehnquist argued: "[L]ittle can be gained in the area of constitutional law, and much lost in the process of democratic decisionmaking, by allowing individual judges in city after city to second-guess ...
legislative or administrative determinations" to ban signs. 2 6 3 This
Note argues that, in the case of sign prohibitions, the identifying/
nonidentifying distinction puts an appropriate limit on "democratic
decisionmaking" with respect to aesthetic judgments.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Metromedia seven Supreme Court justices agreed that a city
may regulate aesthetics under its police power and that generally a city
may ban outdoor signs for aesthetic reasons alone. But four of these
seven justices restricted such a ban to commercial signs, holding that
the first amendment affords greater protection for noncommercial
signs. These four criticized the San Diego ordinance for favoring certain types of noncommercial signs over others. They reasoned that,
generally speaking, all noncommercial speech has equal value under
the first amendment. But given their basic sympathy for local aesthetic interests, one suspects that had they been presented with a principled means by which to distinguish noncommercial signs that could
be prohibited from noncommercial signs that could not be, some of
them might have contributed to a different and more sensible precedent for sign prohibition cases. This Note has presented such a principled means, arguing that - as aesthetic considerations motivate sign
bans - it should not matter whether a sign is commercial or noncommercial. Only signs that identify the premises on which they are located must be constitutionally protected. Additionally, the Note has
argued that a government may ban nonidentifying signs at its discretion as long as it does not discriminate against viewpoint or against
260.
261.
262.
263.

453 U.S. 490, 565 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
453 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
See 453 U.S. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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controversial subject matter, and as long as the effect of the regulation
relates reasonably to its objective.
In defending the distinction between identifying and nonidentifying signs, the Note has demonstrated the inadequacy of protecting all
noncommercial signs. Affording this protection ignores the fact that
sign bans target the signs themselves, not their content; more importantly, it ignores whether or not a given sign can be replaced by an
alternative means of communication. Identifying signs - whether
commercial or noncommercial - deserve constitutional protection because no other medium can assume the sign's function of telling the
viewer he has arrived at a given place. Nonidentifying signs whether commercial or noncommercial - should not be constitutionally protected in general because where a sign prohibition does not
target sign content in order to control public debate, local efforts to
remove perceived unsightliness should be respected.
-

R. Douglass Bond

